Abstract-We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case when the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of any subset of players. An interference graph is employed to illustrate the partially-coupled cost functions and the asymmetric information requirements. For a given interference graph, we design a generalized communication graph so that players with possibly partially-coupled cost functions exchange only their required information and make decisions based on them. Using a set of standard assumptions on the cost functions, interference and communication graphs, we prove almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium for diminishing step sizes. We then quantify the effect of the second largest eigenvalue of the expected communication matrix on the convergence rate, and illustrate the trade-off between the parameters associated with the communication and the interference graphs. Finally, the efficacy of the proposed algorithm on a large-scale networked game is demonstrated via simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed seeking of Nash equilibria in networked games has received considerable attention in recent years [1] - [8] . A networked game can be represented by a graphical model which enables us to index the cost function of each player as a function of player's own actions and those of his neighbors in the graph. There are many real-world applications that motivate us to generalize the Nash seeking problem to a graphical game setup [5] , [6] . The collection of transmitters and receivers in a wireless data network can be captured as a graphical model. Interferences among the transmitters and receivers affect the players' signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) [7] . An optical network is another relevant application that can be modeled as a graphical game. The channels are assumed to be the players and interferences, which affect the optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) of each channel, can be modeled by graph edges, [9] .
In this work we design a locally distributed algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking in a graphical game. In such a game, the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of any subset of players. They exchange the required information locally according to a communication graph and update their actions to optimize their cost functions. Due to limited information available from local neighbors, each player maintains an estimate of the other players' actions and update their estimates during the iterations.
Literature review. A graphical game is a succinct representation of a multi-player game considering the local
A. Graph Theory Notions
The following definitions are from [19] , [20] . A subgraph H of a graph G is a graph whose vertices and edges are a subset of the vertex set and edge set of G, respectively. A subgraph H is a spanning subgraph of G, if it contains all the vertices of G. A triangle-free subgraph H of a graph G is a subgraph in which no three vertices form a triangle of edges. H is a maximal triangle-free subgraph of G if adding a missing edge to H creates a triangle.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a multi-player game in a network with a set of players V = {1, . . . , N }. For i ∈ V , there is a real-valued function J i indicating player i's individual cost function. The players' cost functions are not necessarily fully coupled in the sense that they may be affected by the actions of any number of other players. To illustrate the partially coupled cost functions, we define an interference graph, denoted by G I (V, E I ), with E I marking player pairs that interfere one with another. We denote with N I (i), the set of neighbors of player i in G I , i.e., N I (i) := {j ∈ V |(i, j) ∈ E I }. We also defineÑ I (i) := N I (i) ∪ {i}.
Assumption 1. G I is connected and undirected.
Let Ω j ⊂ R denote the action set of player j. We denote by Ω the action set of all players, i.e., Ω = i∈V Ω i ⊂ R N where denotes the Cartesian product. For i ∈ V , J i : Ω i → R is the cost function of player i where
is the action set of players affecting the cost function of player i. The game denoted by G(V, Ω i , J i , G I ) is defined based on the set of players V , the action set Ω i , ∀i ∈ V , the cost function J i , ∀i ∈ V and G I .
For
denote the other players' actions which affect the cost function of player i. Let also x = (x i , x −i ) ∈ Ω, with x i ∈ Ω i and x −i ∈ Ω −i := j∈V /{i} Ω j , denote all other players' actions except i. The game defined on G I is played such that for given x i −i ∈ Ω i −i , each player i aims to minimize his own cost function selfishly to find an optimal action,
Note that there are N separate simultaneous optimization problems and each of them is run by a particular player i. We assume that the cost function J i and the action set Ω i are only available to player i. Thus every player knows which other players' actions affect his cost function.
A Nash equilibrium of the game for the case when G I is not a complete graph is defined as follows.
∈ Ω is called a Nash equilibrium of this game if for every given x
The players are required to exchange some information to update their actions. A communication graph G C (V, E C ) is defined with E C ⊆ V ×V denoting the set of communication links between the players. (i, j) ∈ E C if and only if players i and j communicate. The set of neighbors of player i in G C , denoted by N C (i), is defined as N C (i) := {j ∈ V |(i, j) ∈ E C }. In order to reduce the number of communications between players, we design a G C such that only the required information is exchanged.
A Nash equilibrium can be efficiently computed by solving a variational inequality V I(Ω, F ) where Ω ⊂ R N is the action set of all players and F : Ω → R N is a pseudogradient mapping defined as [21] . In the following we state a few assumptions for the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. Assumption 3. For every i ∈ V , the action set Ω i is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of R.
Assumption 5. ∇ xi J i (x i , u) is Lipschitz continuous in x i , for every fixed u ∈ Ω i −i and for every i ∈ V , i.e., there exists σ i > 0 such that
Our objective is to find an algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium of G(V, Ω i , J i , G I ) with partially coupled cost functions as described by G I (V, E I ) using only imperfect information over the communication graph G C (V, E C ).
III. ASYNCHRONOUS GOSSIP-BASED ALGORITHM
We propose a distributed algorithm, using an asynchronous gossip-based method in [18] . We obtain a Nash equilibrium of G(V, Ω i , J i , G I ) by solving the associated V I problem by a projected gradient-based approach with diminishing step size. The mechanism of the algorithm can be briefly explained as follows: Each player builds and maintains an estimatex i j , j ∈Ñ I (i) of the actions which affect his cost function (as in G I ) and locally communicates with his neighbors over G C to exchange his estimates and update his action.
The algorithm is elaborated in the following steps: 1-Initialization Step: Each player i maintains an initial 6112 temporary estimate for the players whose actions affect his cost function,
2-Gossiping
Step: At the gossiping step, player i k wakes up at T (k) and selects a communication neighbor indexed by j k ∈ N C (i k ). They exchange their temporary estimate vectors and construct their estimate of the players whose actions affect their cost functions.
The estimates are computed as in the following:
Note that the player i's estimate of his action is indeed his action, i.e.,x
Step: All the players update their actions according to a projected gradient-based method. 
Euclidean projection and α k,i are diminishing step sizes such that
is inversely related to the number of updates ν k (i) that each player i has made until time k (i.e., α k,i = 1 ν k (i) ). At this moment all the temporary estimates are updated for every i ∈ V, j ∈Ñ I (i) as follows:
In (10) for j = i, player i's temporary estimate is updated by his action. At this point, the players begin a new iteration from step 2.
The algorithm is inspired by [18] except that only the required information is exchanged. When G I is not complete, the proposed algorithm can offer substantial savings.
IV. CONVERGENCE FOR DIMINISHING STEP SIZE
Consider a memory M k to denote the sigma-field generated by the history up to time k − 1 with The following lemma holds for G I and G C . Lemma 1. Let G I and G C satisfying Assumptions 1, 2. Then every estimate is exchanged after sufficiently many iterations.
In the following we write the algorithm in a compact form.
where
where e i is a unit vector in R m whose i-th element is 1 and 0 m is the all zeros vector in R m . The communication matrix W (k) is defined as
where 
, where I(i) := {d : d = s ij , j ∈ N I (i)} and s ij is as in (11) .
The convergence proof has two steps: 1) First, we prove almost sure convergence of the temporary estimate vector to the average of all temporary estimate vectors (Theorem 1). 2) Secondly, we prove convergence of the actions toward the Nash equilibrium, almost surely (Theorem 2). The average of all temporary estimates of the players is denoted by z(k) ∈ R N . Let z(k) :=Hx(k) ∈ R N where,
The augmented average of all temporary estimates is as 6113 follows:
The convergence proof depends on some key properties of W and H given in Lemma 2-5.
Lemma 2. Let W(k) and H be defined in (13) and (15) . The following properties hold:
Lemma 4. Let R := I m − HH with H,H defined in (15), (14) . Then R = 1, where · denoting the reduced norm.
Using Lemmas 2-5, we show in the following theorem that under Assumptions 1-3x(k) converges to Z(k). Theorem 1. Letx(k) be the stack vector with all temporary estimates and Z(k) be its average as in (16) . Let also α k,max = max i∈V α k,i . Then under Assumptions 1-3, i)
Theorem 1 yields the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let z(k)
:=Hx(k) ∈ R N be the average of all players' temporary estimates. Under Assumptions 1-3, the following hold for players' actions x(k).
i)
By Theorem 1 and Corollary 1,x(k) and x(k) converge to Z(k) and z(k), respectively as k → ∞.
Theorem 2. Let x(k) and x
* be all players' actions and the Nash equilibrium of G, respectively. Under Assumptions 1-5, the sequence {x(k)} generated by the algorithm converges to x * , almost surely.
V. CONVERGENCE RATE
In this section we compare the convergence rate of the algorithm proposed in Section III (denoted as Algorithm 1) with the algorithm in [18] (denoted as Algorithm 2). Algorithm 1 is an extension of Algorithm 2 by considering partially-coupled cost functions for the players via G I . Algorithm 2 operates as if a fully-coupled cost function is assigned to each player and the interference graph is complete.
By Assumption 2, any feasible communication graph for Algorithm 1 has a lower bound G m , however, the communication graph for Algorithm 2 can be minimally connected. Thus, for the best case scenario we expect more iterations for Algorithm 1 than Algorithm 2 from the point of view of the parameters associated with G C .
In the following, we compare Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 from the point of view of G I . We can show that for each iteration, Algorithm 1 needs less time than Algorithm 2 since less information (estimate) is needed to be exchanged.
For the sake of comparison, we assume that both algorithms run over the same G C ⊇ G m . Let r be the time required to exchange an estimate, and let s be the time required to process a full gradient. Note that the processing time for the gradient is linearly dependent on the data set. We ignore the time required to compute the projection in the local step. Thus for each iteration, the average time required to exchange all the estimates between players i and j and to update the actions under Algorithm 1 is
where p ij is the probability that players i and j contact each other. |N I (i) ∩ N I (j)|r is the time required to exchange all the estimates of player i which affect player j's cost function except player i's action. 
In Algorithm 2 the average time for each iteration is computed by replacing |N I (i) ∩ N I (j)| and m i in (17) with N − 1 and N , respectively. Then we obtain,
In the following, we discuss the number of iterations required for each algorithm such that the players' actions converge to a Nash equilibrium. To simplify the analysis, we assume constant step sizes (i.e., α k,i = α i ). Note that for constant step sizes there exists a steady-state offset between x(k) and x * , see [18] . Let this minimum value of error be denoted by d
We use a modified -averaging time similar to Definition 1 in [22] for the convergence time.
Definition 2. For any 0 < < 1, the -averaging time of an algorithm, N av ( ), is defined as
By Definition 2, N av ( ) is the minimum number of iterations it takes for x(k) − x * to approach an -ball around d * with a high probability, regardless of x(0). The following assumption guarantees N av ( ) to be well-defined. Assumption 6. We assume a non-zero minimum value, denoted by x min (0), for the norm of the initial action of player i for i ∈ V , i.e., x i (0) ≥ x min (0) > 0.
We obtain a lower bound for the -averaging time under Algorithms 1, 2 by applying Markov's inequality: for any random variable X ≥ 0 and > 0, the following holds:
For constant step sizes we consider the following assumption rather than Assumption 4.
Theorem 3. Let α i be constant step sizes which satisfy 0 < φ < 1 where,
with p max = max i∈V p i , p min = min i∈V p i , α max = max i∈V α i , α min = min i∈V α i , ρ be the Lipschitz constant of F and µ be the positive constant for the strong monotonicity property of F . Under Assumptions 1-3, 5, 6 , 7, theaveraging time N av ( ) is bounded as follows:
, and a, b are positive and increasing with γ.
Proof . The proof follows by upper bounding E x(k + 1)−x * 2 and then using Markov's inequality (20) to obtain a lower bound for N av ( ). First, we start to find an upper bound for
. After some manipulations one can obtain,
where C 1 , C 2 > 0 depend on γ, α max and N . Using (23), after some manipulations one can obtain,
Since 0 < φ < 1, by using Markov's inequality (20) and (24) the following inequality follows,
Using Definition 2 and Assumption 6, one can obtain a lower bound for N av ( ) from (26), Lemma 6. LetW := E[W (k)] be the expected communication matrix. ThenW is doubly stochastic with λ max (W ) = 1. Let λ 2 (W ) be second largest eigenvalue ofW , i.e., λ 2 (W ) := max λ =1 λ(W ). Then γ as defined in Lemma 5,
By Lemma 6, γ is equal to the second largest eigenvalue ofW which can be derived as follows:
. This leads us to conclude that the number of iterations is dependent on the structure of the expected communication matrix, hence the parameters associated with the interference and the communication graphs. Note that (26) reveals that N av ( ) is not only dependent on γ but also dependent on φ (22), which is a parameter associated with the cost functions.
To sum up this section, from the perspective of parameters associated with G I , we can conclude that each iteration length is reduced when we consider the interference graph. Moreover, the number of iterations for each algorithm is tightly dependent on the second largest eigenvalue of the expected communication matrix hence on G C .
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we present a numerical example and compare Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Consider a Wireless Ad-Hoc Network (WANET) which consists of 16 mobile nodes interconnected by multi-hop communication paths [23] . Consider N ah = {1, . . . , 16} as the set of wireless nodes and L ah = {L l } l∈L as the set of links connecting the nodes with L = {1, . . . , 16} as the set of link indices. Let V = {U 1 , . . . , U 15 } denote the set of users (players) who want to use this wireless network to transfer data. Fig. 1 (a) represents the topology of the WANET in which a unique path is assigned to each user to transfer his data from the source to the destination node. Each U i is characterized by a set of links (path), R i , i ∈ V .
The interferences of the users to each other are represented in Fig. 1 (b) . Nodes specify the users and edges demonstrate which users have a common link in their paths. Each link L j ∈ L ah has a positive capacity
where κ is a positive network-wide known parameter and χ i is a positive user-specific parameter. The notation a : b ∈ c translates into "set of a's such that b is contained in c".
We investigate the effectiveness of Algorithm 1 over the communication graph G C which is depicted in Fig. 1 (c) . Then we compare its convergence rate with Algorithm 2 over the same G C . Let χ i = 10 for i ∈ V and C j = 10 for j ∈ L. iteration is 6 times shorter. Thus, Algorithm 1 is 30 times faster than Algorithm 2 in this example.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A gossip algorithm is proposed to find a Nash equilibrium over a network. A connected interference graph is used to illustrate the locality of the cost functions. Then, a generalized communication graph is designed for the players to exchange only their required information. Using standard assumptions on the cost functions, interference and communication graph we proved the convergence to a Nash equilibrium. The convergence rate of the algorithm is then studied and the effect of the second largest eigenvalue of the expected communication matrix is investigated.
